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This article examines cross-national variations in piracy of U.S. copyright-related
products in the multimedia, entertainment, and software industry. To determine
which economic, legal, and social factors cause the considerable differences in pi-
racyofU.S.copyrightindustries’productsinindividualcountries,wetested4indus-
trymodels.Wefoundthatformostindustriespiracycanbeexplainedbytheriskpro-
file of the country involved (signaling economic and political stability and growth
potential) and the existence of a strong intellectual property rights system. Further-
more, for the 4 analyzed copyright-based industries, considerable variation in piracy
existsbetweengeographicregions.Thisstudyshowsthatdisaggregationofthecopy-
right piracy data by industry is helpful in analyzing and understanding piracy.
U.S. companies with strong copyright interests and their partners are shaping the
intellectual property related trade diplomacy of the United States in the World
Trade Organization. These companies have vigorously argued that inadequate
copyright protection would threaten the basic incentive of copyrights and would
jeopardizeinvestmentsinthecreationandinnovationofproductsinbusiness,liter-
ature, music, arts, and science (Stolpe, 2000). The companies in the copy-
right-based industries share the characteristic that their products can be imitated
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6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands. E-mail: h.vankranenburg@OS.unimaas.nland copied at a relatively low cost (Gallegos, 1999; Stolpe, 2000). These develop-
ments stimulate the desire for improved copyright legislation and cross-border
harmonization of intellectual property rights regimes.
Economists, politicians, legal scholars, and other professionals in the creative
industries are still debating the effects of unauthorized copying on society and
companies and the need to prevent illegal activities. A large group of studies is
concernedwiththeinfluencethatstrengtheningtheprotectionofintellectualprop-
ertyrightswillhaveonsociety.Inthiscontext,researchershaveconsideredtheso-
cial and economic developments of an economy under various enforcement and
protection systems. For instance, Gould and Gruben (1996) found that intellectual
property rights foster the economic growth of a society. Dunning (1993) and
Seyoum (1996) showed that the protection of intellectual property rights is posi-
tively related to rates of foreign direct investments and innovations in a country.
However, Tang and Von Tunzelmann (2000) emphasized that the diffusion of
knowledgeandadoptionofanewtechnologycanalsobespedupwithinaweakin-
tellectualpropertyprotectionregime.Theevidenceregardingtheeffectofintellec-
tual property rights protection on society is inconclusive.
Another group of studies examines the strategic behavior of companies and the
impact of unauthorized copying of their products on their performance. Again the
findings are ambiguous. Gallegos (1999) emphasized that piracy is harmful to
companies in copyright-based industries. As a result of piracy, companies lose
salesandreceivelowerrevenues.Furthermore,bynotknowingtheusersofpirated
products, companies lose opportunities to cross-sell their other products and capi-
talize on any ideas from illegal users for improving the product or developing new
products (Givon, Mahajan, & Muller, 1995). However, other studies did not con-
firm these findings. A company’s most profitable strategy may indeed be to en-
courageimitationwhenthesizeoftheuserbaseinfluencestheperceivedqualityof
the product (e.g., Connor, 1995; Liebowitz, 1985). The company then experiences




copyright protection. Surprisingly little is known about how intellectual property
rights protection is actually determined and which economic, legal, and social fac-




Marron & Steel, 2000) by examining the cross-national variation in piracy in four
U.S.copyright-basedindustries:businesssoftwareapplications,recordandmusical
compositions,motionpictures,andentertainmentsoftware.ItfocusesontheUnited
States because of its size in copyright-related products and the availability of data.
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PIRACY OF U.S. COPYRIGHT-RELATED PRODUCTS
The U.S. core copyright-based industries are categorized broadly into eight indus-
tries: motion pictures (television, theatrical, and home video); recording (records,
tapes, and CDs); music publishing; computer software applications (both for busi-
ness and entertainment); books, journals, and newspaper publishing; radio, televi-
sion,andcablebroadcasting;legitimatetheater;andadvertising(IIPA,2001).These
industriescreatecopyrightedworksastheirprimaryproduct.Theeconomiccontri-
bution of these industries to the U.S. economy is substantial. The copyright-based
industries’foreignsalesandexportscontinuetobelargerthantheexportsofalmost
allotherU.S.leadingindustries,suchaschemicalsandalliedproducts,automobiles,
aircraft, and agriculture (IIPA, 2001). However, the most important weakness of
these creative industries relates to the ease with which their products can be (ille-
gally)copiedandsold.Recently,theincreaseincopying-relatedinnovationshasfur-
therfacilitatedpiracyandasaconsequencemayhaveanegativeeffectonthefinan-
cial results of the creative companies. These developments have prompted a desire
forinternationalcopyrightlegislation.AspartoftheIIPAeffortstoprotecttheU.S.
copyright-based industries, it annually reports the deficiencies of the copyright re-
gimes of countries where the U.S. copyright-based industries suffered the most.
These countries are ranked on the Special 301 lists according to the importance of
monitoring their intellectual property practices by the United States (IIPA, 1999,
2000,2001).Inthisstudy,wefocusonpiracyratesforfourcreativeindustriesindif-
ferent countries for the year 1999: motion pictures, sound recording and musical
compositions,businesssoftwareapplications,andentertainmentsoftware.1Thepi-
racyratesforaparticularcreativeindustryvarysubstantiallyamongcountries.Ac-






nam (98%) had the highest. The average entertainment software piracy rate was
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the standard deviation is high, with rates ranging from 8% for Czech Republic to
95% for Brazil and Ukraine.
Although the piracy rates differ significantly within and between countries for
these four industries, they give insufficient information to draw conclusions on the
economic effects of unauthorized production and distribution of materials for per-
sonal and business purposes. IIPA (1999, 2000, 2001) reported estimates of the
revenue losses suffered by the four U.S. creative industries; however, these data
have to be carefully interpreted, because they overestimate the incurred loss. First,
lossrevenueisusuallyestimatedbymultiplyingthelegitimatepriceoftheproduct
by the estimated number of pirated copies. However, many of these copies would
not have been purchased at the legitimate price (Marron & Steel, 2000). Second,
companies may experience positive network externalities due to piracy resulting
from an increase in the critical mass. Given that no other data are available, these
estimates currently provide the best insights into the financial consequences of pi-
racy for the creative industries.
We found a very weak relation between the estimated dollar revenue losses suf-
fered by the U.S. copyright-based industries in foreign countries and piracy rates.
The average correlation between piracy rates and associated revenue losses was
only 0.15 and statistically not significant different from zero. It is therefore possi-
blethatconsiderablerevenuelossessufferedbyU.S.creativecompaniesduetopi-
racy occur in countries that have low piracy rates.
The entertainment software industry has both the highest mean and the highest
standard deviation, signaling considerable revenue losses for U.S. firms. Accord-
ing to IIPA (2001), the estimated worldwide total revenue loss for this U.S. indus-
try amounts to at least 2.9 billion U.S. dollars (USD). China created the highest
revenue loss for the entertainment software companies, amounting to almost 1.4
billion USD, whereas countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala showed the
lowestrevenuelosses(0.1millionUSD).Theestimatedrevenuelossessufferedby
U.S. creative companies caused by unauthorized production and distribution of
business software applications was also the highest in China (437.20 million
USD), although now closely followed by Italy (338.40 million USD) and Brazil
(319.30 million USD). The lowest ranked country is Lebanon, with a counterfeit-
ing revenue loss of only 1.6 million USD. However, in terms of sound recordings
andmusicalcompositions,revenuelosseswerehighestinBrazil,withanunautho-
rized copyright production of 300 million USD. In contrast, other countries, such
as Oman, Qatar, and Jordan, created revenue losses for U.S. companies in these
materialsbelow1millionUSD.TheestimatedaverageU.S.motionpicturescoun-
112 VAN KRANENBURG AND HOGENBIRKterfeiting revenue loss in the countries listed in the 301 Report was approximately
29 million USD, with the levels ranging from 0.5 million for Qatar to 250 million
for the Russian Federation.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
Only recently, economists and policy analysts have begun to explore the determi-
nants of intellectual property rights protection and violation. Most studies have in-
vestigated the patent-related industries and the business software applications in-
dustry. Few studies have explored the differences in other creative industries’
piracy rates or estimated revenue losses at the country level. This article attempts
to bridge this gap. As a starting point for this study, we use the findings of various
works that investigate the cross-national differences of piracy in the copy-
right-basedindustries,contributingthesedifferencestoacountry’sspecificsocial,
legal, and economic factors. Broadly speaking, four groups of variables influence
thelevelsofpiracyandtheintellectualpropertyrightsprotectioninacountry.First
of all, many studies have investigated the relation between a country’s economic
situation and the intellectual property rights (in particular, patent) protection.
These studies include, among others, Ginarte and Park (1997) and Marron and
Steel (2000). The literature indicates a relation between market size and intellec-
tual property rights protection. Large markets, in general, are attractive locations
for inward foreign direct investments (Buckley & Casson, 1981). However, for-
eign direct investments are not attracted to places with weak intellectual property
rights protection (Dunning, 1993; Lee & Mansfield, 1996; Seyoum, 1996). Fur-
thermore, large markets contain more opportunities for piracy, given that the iden-
tification of the unauthorized producers and users of the illegal products is more
difficult than in smaller markets (Tang & Von Tunzelmann, 2000). In a large mar-
ket, even piracy on a small scale can create a considerable loss for the creative
firms. To protect their businesses, these companies put pressure on host country
governments to strengthen the protection of intellectual property rights
(Samuelson,1999).Theymayretaliatewithactions,suchastradeimpediments,to
ensure protection from piracy. This threat of retaliation increases with the size of
the host market (Stegemann, 2000). Many larger countries therefore try to reduce
the unauthorized production and use of intellectual property rights related prod-
ucts. To examine the relation between market size and piracy rates and revenue
losses suffered by foreign copyright-based industries in a country, we suggest the
following two hypotheses:
H1a: The larger the market size of a host country, the lower the piracy rates of
copyright-based products.
COPYRIGHT PIRACY 113H1b: Thelargerthemarketsizeofahostcountry,thehighertherevenuelosses
suffered by foreign copyright-based industries.








tries with strong institutions protecting contracts and property also tend to have
lowerpiracyrates.Ingeneral,countriesthatmakeinefficientpublicinvestmentsand
economicpolicydecisionsdonothaveprotectionsystemsorhaveweakones(Knack
& Keefer, 1995). Ginarte and Park (1997) emphasized that indicators of political
credibility and economic development, such as market freedom and openness, are
important determinants of the provision of property rights.
The level of economic and social development, political credibility, and the se-




terized by high risk and are therefore likely to suffer considerable revenue losses.
Moreover, the security of property and contractual rights and efficiency is nega-
tively related to the country risk. We therefore hypothesize:
H2: Countries that are characterized by more political and economic risk ex-
hibithigherpiracyratesandrevenuelossesforforeigncopyright-basedcompanies
than countries with low risk characteristics.
The second group of factors relates to the size of the user base of copyright-related
products (e.g., Givon et al., 1995). The size of the user base becomes important
whenthereisapositiveconsumptionornetworkexternalitythatexistsiftheutility
fortheproductincreaseswithpiracy,becauseitincreasesthenumberofotherindi-
viduals using it (Shy & Thisse, 1999; Takeyama, 1997). The risk of piracy in-
creases with the number of owners of complementary products—such as televi-
sions, personal computers (PCs), and CD players—because they are potential
users of copyright-related products. For instance, Gallegos (1999) and
Moorehouse (2001) indicated that software piracy has increased considerably due
totheexplosivegrowthinthenumberofpeoplethathaveaccesstotheInternetand
the advances in technology that have increased the ease and speed of access to the
Internet. Unlike the physical distribution of pirated software, the Internet allows
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without anyone’s knowledge. Similarly, Ostergard (2000) stressed that the great
advances in technology have resulted in easier methods of duplicating that same
technologyandassociatedproducts.Forinstance,theintroductionofvideorecord-
ers in the consumer market has brought with it a capacity to duplicate videotapes,
bringing about potentially massive violations of entertainment industry copyright
protection. Likewise, Silva and Ramello (2000) indicated that the introduction of
recording equipment by Philips and other producers in the late 1960s resulted in
private music copying by individual consumers using their home equipment. This
leads to the following hypotheses:
H3: Countries that are characterized by a high density of computers exhibit
higher piracy rates and revenue losses for foreign copyright-based companies than
countries that have a low computer density.
H4: Inthemotionpicturevideoandentertainmentindustries,countriesthatare
characterized by a high density of television sets exhibit higher piracy rates and





ing of their own unique assets to remain competitive in the international arena
(Gould&Gruben,1996).Thesecountriesaremorecarefulintheirinternationalrela-




measures to be negatively related with a country’s level of export.
Another interesting measure is the share of high technology exports in total ex-
ports,whichisagoodindicatorofthetechnologylevelofthatparticularcountry.The
highertheleveloftechnology,themorelikelyitisthatunauthorizedproductionand
distribution of copyright-based materials will take place, because the skills and re-
latedtechnologiesareavailable(see,e.g.,Ostergard,2000).Animportantexample
iscomputersoftwarefromHongKong(Gallegos,1999).Whencountrieslackamin-
imum technology base, they are not able to copy high-technology products. We
wouldthereforeexpectapositiverelationbetweenthepiracymeasuresandtheshare
of high-technology exports. We suggest the following hypotheses:
H5: Countries that strongly depend on exports exhibit lower piracy rates and
revenue losses for foreign copyright-based companies than countries that are less
dependent on exports.
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exports exhibit higher piracy rates and revenue losses for foreign copyright-based
companies than countries that have a relatively small share of high-technology
products in exports.
The last essential group is composed of legal factors. Intellectual property rights
protection has two components: a statute component and an enforcement compo-
nent. We must consider both the strength of the laws and the enforcement of those
laws to assess the extension of intellectual property rights protection in a country
(Ostergard, 2000; Samuelson, 1999). The enforcement of intellectual property
rights embodies two tasks: preventing their infringement by free-riders and disci-
plining attempts by the rights holders to extend them beyond the terms of the grant
(Maskus, 1998). For the enforcement of these laws, countries must have institu-
tional structures and financial resources (Ostergard, 2000). In empirical studies,
intellectual property rights protection is frequently measured by the country’s
membership in international conventions on the subject (Ginarte & Park, 1997).
Burke(1996),forinstance,testedtheimportanceofconventionmembershiponpi-
racy levels in the audio software industry. Several international conventions (such
as Berne 1887, Rome 1961, Geneva Phonogram 1971) have tried to enforce copy-
rightprotectionforartistsandproducersinthemusicindustry.Burke(1996)found
that countries that are members of those convention agreements have lower piracy
rates than countries that are not. We therefore hypothesize:
H7: The existence of an extensive copyright protection system in a country re-
duces the piracy rates and the revenue losses suffered by foreign copyright-based
companies.
THE DATA
The data set for this study was composed of data from various sources. The pri-
mary sources we employed were the IIPA (1999, 2000, 2001) and the World Bank
(2000, 2001). The former provides data on the estimated copyright piracy rate lev-
els and the associated estimated aggregate revenue losses suffered by U.S. copy-
right-based industries in the countries that are listed on the Special 301 reports.
The world development indicators database of the World Bank provides an exten-
sive collection of data about social, financial, economic, and political indictors.
For this study, we used only those countries for which sufficient data were avail-
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TABLE 1
Overview of Countries Monitored by the International Intellectual Property Alliance,
Their Membership of Intellectual Property Right Treaties, and the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights Under National Laws























Argentina Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Bolivia Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Brazil Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Chile Yes Yes Yes No No No No
China Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Colombia Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No
Costa Rica Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Czech Republic Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Dominican Republic Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Egypt Yes No Yes No No Yes No
El Salvador Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No
Estonia Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
Greece Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Guatemala Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Hungary Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
India Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Indonesia Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
Israel Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jordan Yes No Yes No No Yes No
Korea Republic Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Kuwait No No No No No No No
Latvia Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
Lebanon Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No
Lithuania (OCR) Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
Malaysia Yes No Yes No No Yes No
Oman Yes No Yes No No Yes No
Pakistan Yes Yes No No No Yes No
Paraguay Yes No Yes No No Yes No
Peru Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No
Philippines Yes No Yes No No Yes No
Poland Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Qatar Yes No Yes No No Yes No
Romania Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
Russian Federation Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Saudi Arabia No Yes No No No Yes No
Slovakia Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
(continued)valueofthedependentvariablerevenueloss.Becauserevenuelossesweredefinedas
≥0, the use of the log value of specific revenue losses was an attractive feature.
Weincludedacountry’sdomesticmarketsizetotestH1aandH1b.Following,for




piracy rates and log value of the revenue losses due to piracy, respectively.
The level of exports was measured by the share of exports of goods and ser-
vices in GDP. High-technology exports were measured as the percentage of total
manufactured exports made up by high-technology products. The values of the
number of PCs and the number of TVs per 1,000 persons were conversed into
natural logarithm values. This procedure renders the relations between rates and
revenue losses and each of the explanatory variables in percentage terms, either
by definition of the variable itself as a percentage or by transformation of the re-
lation to log values.
TheriskofacountrywasmeasuredbytheEuromoney’scountryriskrating(see
World Bank, 2000). Countries are rated on a scale of 1 (very high risk) to 100 (no
risk). These risk ratings are based on nine weighted categories that access country





mented by quantitative data (Oetzel et al., 2001).
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Taiwan No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Thailand Yes No No No No Yes No
Turkey Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
Ukraine Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Uruguay Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No
Venezuela Republic Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No
Vietnam No No Yes No Yes Yes No
Note. Source:FenwickandWest(2000),InternationalIntellectualPropertyAlliance(2001),andWorldIntel-
lectual Property Organization (2001).A variety of data sources on international legal protection for copyright-based
materialswereconsultedtodetermineifprotectionisavailableinaparticularcoun-
try for either a U.S. or a foreign company. An index was constructed that indicated
how strongly a country would provide intellectual property rights protection. The
variableequals1ifthecountryinquestionmeetsallthefollowingthreecriteria:(a)
Protection is available under the national copyright law of a particular country; (b)










dex varies from 1 (strong protection)t o0( low protection).
The sample included a substantial number of countries from different regions:
EastEurope(10),Asia(11),theMiddleEast(8),andLatinAmerica(13).Itisclear
that countries from Western Europe (2) and Africa (zero) do not have the highest
monitoring priority by the U.S. government. In Western Europe, overall the coun-
tries adequately and effectively protect U.S. intellectual property rights and pro-
vide fair and equitable market access to U.S. companies that produce copy-
right-based materials (Markusen, 2001). In Africa, only few business activities
occur, reducing the overall risk of piracy.
RESULTS
Table 2 shows the results of the model of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations
for piracy rates. We tested our model for four U.S. copyright-based industries in
which intellectual property rights protection matters: business software applica-




invention is only a mathematical algorithm, such as a computer program designed to convert bi-
nary-coded decimal numbers into binary numbers, then the invention is not eligible for patent protec-
tion. However, if the invention utilizes the device to manipulate numbers that represent concrete,
real-worldvalues,thentheinventionisaprocessrelatingtothosereal-worldconceptsandispatentable.
However,copyrightsarethestrongestlegalprotectioninstrumenttobeusedinthefighttoreduceglob-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































racy rates for the copyright-based products is positively associated with countries
withhigh-riskcharacteristics,suchaspoliticalandeconomicinstability.Wedidfind
that for all four industries, low country risk resulted in a significantly lower piracy
rate,althoughentertainmentsoftwareshowedaweakrelation.Thus,theresultssup-
portH2forthebusinesssoftwareapplications,recordingandmusicalcompositions,





therefore found no support for H3 in the case of piracy rates.
Wealsohypothesizedthatthecountriesdependingonexportsaremoreinclined
to respect the intellectual property of foreign firms. However, the results do not
support the relation between dependence on exports and copyright protection. We
therefore cannot confirm H5. In H6 we argue that the higher the level of technol-
ogy, the more likely that unauthorized production and distribution of copy-
right-based materials would take place because the skills and related technologies
areavailable.However,noconclusiveevidencewasfoundfortherelationbetween
acountry’stechnologylevelandthepiracyrateforthestudiedcreativeindustries.
H7 argues that countries with strong copyright protection systems have low pi-
racy rates. The estimates of the indicator for the country’s copyright protection
system was negative and for two industries significantly different from zero. Thus,
asufficientlegalsystemwithstrongcopyrightprotectiongenerallyresultsinlower
piracy rates. This effect was particularly strong and significant in the case of the
entertainment software industry and business software applications industry.
Hence, these results confirm H7.
It is interesting to note that we found strong differences in piracy rates among
differentregionsintheworld.OurbenchmarkregionwasLatinAmerica.Theesti-
mates show that Western European and Asian countries demonstrate a higher ille-
gal use of business software applications than their Latin American counterparts.
Furthermore, the Eastern European countries show a larger inclination to copy en-
tertainment software materials than countries in other regions.
Table 3 presents the results of the model OLS estimations for revenue losses
sufferedbythefourU.S.copyright-basedindustriesabroad.Whenconsideringthe
estimated dollar revenue losses for U.S. firms due to piracy in other countries, we
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.found related, though slightly different, results as for piracy rates. First of all, con-
trarytotheresultsforpiracyrates,wefoundstrongevidenceofapositiveinfluence
of the market size of the host country and the estimated revenue losses of U.S. cre-
ative companies resulting from illegal copying of business software applications,
entertainment software, sound recording and musical compositions, and motion
pictures industries. Thus, the estimates of market size strongly support H1b.
Theresultsoncountryriskareconflicting.Inthecaseofthemotionpicturesin-
dustry, they confirmed our expectation that higher stability results in a decline of
revenue losses for U.S. companies. However, we found that in the case of business
software applications, it actually results in an increase in revenue losses. There-
fore, H2 cannot be generally accepted.
Regarding the density of television sets, we again found evidence that supports
H4 in the case of the motion pictures industry. In this particular industry, a high
penetration of television sets results in an increase in estimated revenue losses.
Again, we found that the density of PCs in a country has no influence on the esti-
mated revenue losses in any of these four copyright-based industries. Thus, H3
about the effect of the penetration of PCs on the suffered revenue losses due to pi-
racy is not supported.
Furthermore, the estimate of the indicator for a country’s export dependence
was only positive and significant in the case of the business software applications
industry. This result is surprising because H5 argues that a country with a high ex-
port ratio has an incentive to protect intellectual property right based products of
foreign companies. For the motion pictures industry, we found that countries with
high-technology exports significantly and positively influenced the estimated rev-
enue losses suffered by U.S. companies. It is relatively easy to copy motion pic-
tures and videos once a country has a certain level of technological development.
Thus, H6 is partly supported.
We also hypothesized that a strong system to protect copyrights in a host coun-
try would have a positive impact on the revenue losses of foreign copyright-based
companies due to illegal copying of their products (H7). The estimates of the indi-
cator of a country’s copyright protection system were not significantly different
fromzero.Thus,H7isnotsupportedfortheestimatedrevenuelossesofU.S.com-
panies due to piracy.
Again, we found considerable differences in the effect of specific regions. For
U.S. firms in copyright-based industries, the likelihood of a revenue loss due to
businesssoftwareapplicationspiracywassignificantlysmallerinWesternEurope,
Asia, and the Middle East than in Latin American countries. In the entertainment
software industry, we found evidence that countries in Eastern Europe show the
highest likelihood of revenue losses for U.S. companies due to piracy of entertain-
ment materials. Furthermore, the regions of Asia and the Middle East behave dif-
ferently from the other regions, in particular in comparison with Latin America, in
thesoundrecordingandmusicalcompositionsindustryandmotionpicturesindus-
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erty rights protection system, particularly for copyrights.4 Furthermore, the piracy
dataarebasedononlyfourU.S.copyright-basedindustries.Thisimpliesthatsome
caution must be used regarding the generalization of the findings.
Regarding the economic variables, the results of our analyses strongly support
the hypothesis that, in larger markets, the estimated revenue losses suffered by
U.S. copyright-based companies due to unauthorized (re)production and distribu-
tion of their copyright-related materials in large host markets are considerable,
even when these countries are characterized by relatively low piracy rates. There-
fore, even though host countries may have relatively low piracy rates, the overall
estimatedrevenuelossessufferedbyforeigncopyright-basedcompaniesduetopi-
racy in these economies are not necessarily negligible. This result is in line with
Tang and Von Tunzelmann (2000) who emphasized that large markets offer many
opportunitiesforpiracy,giventhattheidentificationoftheunauthorizedproducers
and users of the illegal products is more difficult than in smaller markets. Even pi-
racy on a small scale can then create a considerable loss for the creative firm.
We found no significant relation between market size and piracy rates. Even
though most studies indicate that larger countries have better intellectual property
rightsprotectionoutoffearforretaliation(Samuelson,1999;Stegemann,2000)or
toremainanattractivelocationforforeigndirectinvestment(Dunning,1993;Lee&
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4As emphasized by one of the reviewers, the United State’s 301 watch lists are quite political. Al-
though primarily shaped by copyright protection and piracy factors, it is also occasionally the case that
a country’s placement on the 301 list reflects nonpiracy-related foreign and trade policy considerations
rather than purely intellectual property issues.variablethatindicatesthelevelofeconomicdevelopmentpersethatinfluencesthe
provision of intellectual property rights, but rather a group of determinants of eco-
nomicdevelopment,suchasincome,stabilityandpoliticalclimate,demandforlux-
ury goods, technology level, market size, and market access and openness.
Tocapturetheseelements,thisstudythereforealsoconsideredcountryriskasa
potentialexplanationforpiracyratesandlosses.Riskwasmeasuredasacombina-
tion of economic performance, political stability, access to domestic markets, and
a country’s debt situation. In general, the evidence shows that countries that have a
high-risk profile offer little protection of copyrights, resulting in high piracy rates,
particularly in the business software application, recording and musical composi-
tions, and motion pictures industries. This result confirms Ginarte and Park
(1997). Countries that are very risky are therefore not attractive locations for busi-
ness activities of U.S. firms in the copyright-based industries. For piracy rates, the
risk variable captures the elements mentioned by Marron and Steel (2000).
The results regarding the actual estimated revenue losses are conflicting. Con-
trary to our expectation, we found that for the business software applications in-
dustries, low-risk countries are actually associated with large revenue losses suf-




used in countries with high-technology knowledge industries. These countries are
characterized by low risk. It seems that revenue losses suffered by creative compa-
nies due to piracy of their products are the highest in these countries.
The second group of variables was the penetration of related products. Our re-
sults confirm the expectation that the risk of piracy increases with the number of
owners of complementary products, which is in line with previous studies by
Takeyama(1997)andShyandThisse(1999).Thisisparticularlytrueincaseofthe
motionpicturesindustryasrelatedtothenumberoftelevisions.Thefactthatmany
households possess TVs and recording equipments encourages the illegal copying
of videos. However, the penetration of computers has no significant effect on the
piracyratesorlossesoccurringinanyofthefourstudiedindustries.Thiscanbeex-
plained by the fact that computers are still a relatively new phenomenon. They are
not nearly as widespread as televisions, and not every household currently has ac-
cesstoacomputer,theInternet,orthenecessarysoftwaretoengageinillegalactiv-
ities, in particular for the countries listed on the 301 report.
The third group of factors considered in this study was trade-related measures.
The results for the two variables introduced here are disappointing. We find no
proof for the hypothesis that exporting countries exhibit lower piracy rates and
losses. This result is not in line with Stegemann (2000) and Stolpe (2000).
Intellectual property rights protection is a tremendously fluid concept strongly
affected by cultural values. It is very much rooted in the Western cultural values of
COPYRIGHT PIRACY 125liberalismandindividualrights.Amajorityofcountriesinoursamplearemiddle-in-
comecountriesthatdonotvalueliberalismandindividualrightsashighasWestern
countries do. In general, even when they are export-oriented, they still have prob-
lemsacceptingthelegitimacyofthemonopolyclaimsoverintellectualpropertyas





group do intellectual property rights protection increase sharply.
The theoretical debate of the effect of the technology level of a country on pi-
racy is still undecided. Our results are in line with Marron and Steel (2000), who
found no convincing evidence for the effect of technology on piracy. However,
despite these results, many innovative firms do perceive substantial revenue
losses in foreign markets from illegal copying (Maskus, 1998). The opportuni-
ties for international free riding have increased because technologies for copying
software, entertainment products, books, transmissions, and certain technologies
have become cheaper and more reliable. This development has therefore in-
creased the pressure for strong international standards on intellectual property
rights protection (Maskus, 1998). As a result, each member of the World Trade
Organization has agreed to develop an intellectual property rights system ac-
cording to minimum standard. However, as of the time of this study, the deadline
for countries to meet the obligations had not passed. The results therefore may
not be visible yet.
Finally, we considered legal factors. Technological advantage is among the
U.S. creative companies’most important strengths, as it is for most multinational
enterprises. Slack intellectual property rights protection in host countries can lead
toarapiderosionofthiskeyadvantage.Locatingresearchanddevelopmentactivi-
ties in a host country with lower intellectual property protection levels increases
the companies’exposure to the possibility of losing technological secrets and ad-
vantages to local competitors. An extensive copyright protection system can help
to protect the intellectual property of these companies. Our evidence shows that
the existence of a strong protection system in a host country indeed reduces the pi-








to investigate whether the universal consideration regarding the findings for pat-
126 VAN KRANENBURG AND HOGENBIRKent-relatedproductsandindustriesarealsovalidforcopyright-relatedproductsand
industries.Giventhisresearchagenda,ourcontributionhascertainlimitations,butit
alsoprovidesuswithsomeinterestinganswerstoanumberofrelevantquestionsre-
garding the determinants of piracy, taking country characteristics into account.
We implicitly modeled that individual countries select their copyright protec-
tion policy as a result of economic and legal conditions. Observed piracy rates and
the estimated revenue losses suffered by copyright-based companies due to piracy
are the outcome of these policies, their implementation, and the response of indi-
viduals and companies to them. An alternative approach, not adopted here, would
be to analyze how individuals decide whether to pirate copyright-related products
based on the costs and benefits facing them.
CONCLUSION
This study examined the cross-national variations in piracy of U.S. copyright-re-
lated products in four creative industries: business software applications, record-
ing and musical compositions, motion pictures, and entertainment software. The
piracy rate and estimated revenue losses data must be interpreted with some cau-
tion, because these data are probably biased in favor of the industries. We ac-
knowledge the limitation of the data. However, given that no other data are avail-
able, we have decided to use the provided figures for our study. The piracy rates
of copyright-related products and the revenue losses suffered by U.S. copy-
right-related companies due to illegal production and distribution of their prod-
ucts abroad show considerable differences among countries and regions but also
among the different kinds of copyright-based industries. We considered four
groups of country-specific variables—economic development and stability, legal
issues, trade relations, and penetration of related products—to explain the
cross-national piracy differences for these creative industries. We show that the
disaggregation of the profile of a country is helpful in analyzing the piracy issue
around the world.
Our most remarkable finding concerns the differences among the determinants




show lower piracy rates and that the revenue losses suffered by U.S. companies
producing and selling copyright-related products in these countries are positively
related with the risk, with one exception: revenue losses due to business software
applications piracy. The evidence shows significant differences in piracy among
separate regions in the world.
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